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Who Needs Credit and Who Gets Credit in Eastern Europe? 
Summary 
Based on survey data covering 8,387 firms in 20 countries we compare credit demand and 
credit supply for firms in Eastern Europe to those for firms in selected Western European 
countries. 
We find that, while 30% of firms do not need credit in Eastern Europe, their need for credit 
is higher than in Western Europe. The firm-level determinants of credit needs in Eastern 
Europe are quite similar to that in Western Europe: Firms with alternative financings 
sources, i.e. government-owned, foreign-owned and internally financed firms, are less 
likely to need credit. Small firms are also less likely to demand credit than larger firms, 
suggesting that they may have limited investment opportunities. 
We find that a higher share of firms is discouraged from applying for a loan in Eastern 
Europe than in Western Europe. Firms in Eastern Europe seem particularly discouraged by 
high interest rates compared to firms in Western Europe, with collateral conditions and loan 
application procedures also more discouraging. The higher rate of discouraged firms in 
Eastern Europe is related to a stronger reluctance of small and financially opaque firms to 
apply for a loan compared to Western Europe. While many discouraged firms correctly 
anticipate that their loan applications would be rejected, a large majority of discouraged 
firms seem to be creditworthy. 
At the country-level we find that the higher rate of discouraged firms in Eastern Europe is 
driven more by the presence of foreign banks than by the macroeconomic environment or 
the lack of creditor protection. We find no evidence that foreign bank presence leads to 
stricter loan approval decisions. 
Our findings suggest to policy makers that the low incidence of bank credit among firms in 
Eastern Europe, compared to Western Europe, is not driven by less need for credit or 
banks’ reluctance to extend loans. The main driver seems to be that many (creditworthy) 
firms are discouraged from applying for a loan, due to high interest rates, collateral 
conditions and cumbersome lending procedures. As discouragement is particularly high 
among small and opaque firms, as well as in countries with a strong presence of foreign 
banks, it seems that firms perceive lending standards to have become more reliant on “hard 
information” with the entry of foreign banks. However, as loan rejection rates are not 
related to foreign bank presence, it seems that firms’ perceptions of the likely lending 
conditions may be too pessimistic. Thus more transparency about credit eligibility and 
conditions may improve credit access, particularly in countries with a high presence of 
foreign banks.  
1. Introduction 
Limited access to bank credit, in particular for small enterprises, is viewed by many policy 
makers and academics as a major growth constraint for emerging and developing 
economies.1 As a result, substantial national and multinational resources have been devoted 
to improving credit availability around the world. In 2008, for example, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), a part of the World Bank Group, invested 310 Million dollars in 
230 projects worldwide, with the aim of improving access to financial services. The IFC 
invested over 80 Million US$ alone to promote small enterprise credit.2
The transition economies of Eastern Europe have undertaken particularly strong efforts to 
reform their banking sectors and enhance the availability of private credit.
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1 Levine (2006) summarizes the country-, industry- and firm-level evidence documenting the positive impact 
of financial development and economic growth. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2008) find that 
financial sector development exerts a disproportionately positive effect on small firms. 
 In almost all 
countries, state-owned banks have been privatized and foreign bank entry has been 
encouraged (EBRD (2006)). The legal environment for secured and unsecured lending has 
been improved, e.g., by establishing centralized pledge registries, or by improving the 
position of creditors in bankruptcy procedures (EBRD (2008)). Information sharing 
between creditors through private credit bureaus or public credit registries has also been 
introduced in most Eastern European countries (Brown, Jappelli and Pagano (2009)). These 
domestic institutional changes have been strongly encouraged and supported by multilateral 
institutions. In addition international financial institutions have provided substantial 
2http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/gfm.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/A2F-HighlightsReport2008/$FILE/A2F-
HighlightsReport2008.pdf. 
3 Our definition of Eastern Europe follows that of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and includes the following 15 countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
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funding to the financial sector in Eastern Europe. In 2008, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) alone held assets of over 7 billion euro towards 
financial institutions across the region.4
Despite the substantial resources invested in improving credit availability in Eastern 
Europe, less than half of the firms in the region actually have bank credit (see Figure 1). 
The use of bank credit does however vary strongly across the region. The share of firms 
with a bank loan varies from 29 percent in Macedonia to more than 66 percent in Croatia. 
While the use of bank credit seems to be low in Eastern Europe, it is only slightly below 
that of selected Western European countries. Indeed, four countries in Eastern Europe 
(Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, and Hungary) have loan incidences which exceed the average 
for the sample of Western European firms. 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 here 
 
Figure 1 gives rise to three important questions for policy makers, when considering future 
policies to enhance credit availability: 
First, to what extent is the low incidence of bank credit in Eastern Europe the result of 
supply-side credit constraints or low credit demand? The similar levels of bank credit in 
                                                 
 
4 EBRD Annual Report 2008, http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/general/ar08.htm. The figure includes investment in 
Eastern Europe and other transition countries. 
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Eastern and Western Europe suggest that at least some firms which do not have bank credit, 
may actually not need or want credit. Knowing the extent to which firms in the region are 
actually credit constrained is crucial for planning future public interventions towards 
financial sector development. 
Second, to what extent are firms which need credit denied credit or discouraged from 
applying for a loan in the first place? Are small firms more often discouraged from 
applying for credit than actually denied credit as recent evidence has shown for both 
developed (Cole 2008) and developing countries (Chavrakarty and Xiang (2009))? 
Knowing to what extent firms are discouraged or denied credit is important for choosing 
the type of public interventions towards improving credit availability. 
Third, how are credit constraints related to differences in the structure and institutions of 
the financial sector across countries? For example, are small firms more likely to be 
discouraged from applying for credit, or denied credit in countries where foreign-owned 
banks are dominant? Knowing how structural and institutional changes to the banking 
sector may affect credit discouragement and denial is crucial for assessing their benefits as 
well as for devising measures to limit their potential adverse effects. 
In this paper, we examine these three questions, using survey data covering 5,040 firms in 
15 Eastern European countries and 3,347 firms in 5 Western European countries. We first 
examine which firms in which countries need bank credit. We then examine which of the 
firms in need of bank credit are discouraged from applying for credit and which firms are 
denied credit when they apply. Finally, we study how loan discouragement and loan 




We find that, while 30% of firms do not need credit in Eastern Europe, credit need is still 
higher in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. The structure of credit needs in Eastern 
Europe is quite similar to that in Western Europe: Firms with alternative financings 
sources, i.e. government-owned, foreign-owned, and internally financed firms, are less 
likely to need credit in both regions. The lower credit needs of small firms are more 
pronounced in Eastern than in Western Europe. 
While firms in Eastern Europe are more likely need credit, they are less likely to actually 
receive a loan. The higher rate of discouraged firms in Eastern Europe seems to be driven 
by a stronger reluctance of small and financially intransparent firms to apply for a loan 
compared to Western Europe. While many discouraged firms correctly anticipate that their 
loan applications would be rejected, a large majority of discouraged firms seem to be 
creditworthy. 
At the country-level we find that the higher rate of discouraged firms in Eastern Europe is 
partly driven by the presence of foreign bank rather than differences in the macroeconomic 
environment or creditor protection. However, we find no evidence that foreign bank 
presence leads to stricter loan approval decisions. 
Our findings suggest to policy makers that the low incidence of bank credit among firms in 
Eastern Europe, compared to Western Europe is not driven by lower demand for credit or 
by banks’ reluctance to extend loans. The main driver seems to be that many (creditworthy) 
firms are discouraged from applying for a loan, due to high interest rates, collateral 
conditions, and cumbersome lending procedures. As discouragement is particularly high 
among small and opaque firms, as well as in countries with a strong presence of foreign 
banks, it seems that firms perceive lending standards to have become more reliant on “hard 
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information” with the entry of foreign banks. However, as loan rejection rates are not 
related to firm transparency or foreign bank presence, it seems that firms’ perceptions of the 
likely lending conditions may be too pessimistic. Thus more transparency about credit 
eligibility and conditions may improve credit access, particularly in countries with a high 
presence of foreign banks. 
Our findings are also relevant for judging the potential impact of the current financial crisis 
on Eastern Europe, in particular, of a credit crunch due to capital outflows from the region. 
During the last decade, rapid credit growth in the region was strongly driven by foreign 
participation in and capital flows to the region’s banking sector. For example, according to 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Banking Statistics, consolidated foreign claims 
on banks in Emerging Europe rose from $366 billion in September 2004 to $1,588 billion 
in June 2008 on an immediate borrower basis.5 However, since the onset of the current 
financial crisis, capital flows to Emerging Europe, and particularly to banks in the region 
have been drying up dramatically. Indeed, according to the Institute of International 
Finance (IIF), Emerging Europe is the region most directly affected by the declining 
international capital flows.6
                                                 
 
5 According to the BIS definition, Emerging Europe consists of the Eastern European countries in our sample, 
minus Slovenia, plus Belarus, Moldova, Montenegro, Turkey, and Ukraine. 
 This severe contraction in refinancing of the region’s banking 
sector immediately raises the question of which firms in Eastern Europe will most likely 
face tighter credit constraints and what the credit contraction implies for the economic 
performance of the entire region. Our results suggest that especially export-orientated firms, 




which have the highest credit demand, may be hit hardest by a potential credit crunch, 
while smaller firms, with their lower demand for bank credit, may be less affected. 
Our study is related to a growing body of literature which examines how banking sector 
structure and institutional development affect credit availability in Eastern Europe. Given 
that foreign banks now dominate the banking sector in many Eastern European countries, 
their impact on credit availability has come under particular scrutiny (de Haas and Lelyveld 
(2006)). Concerns remain that small and opaque firms can be serviced only poorly by 
foreign banks (Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008)), though the evidence is not 
unambiguous (Giannetti and Ongena (2008, 2009)).7
Our paper further contributes to the literature on loan demand and discouragement by 
providing cross-country evidence. Most published work which examines loan demand and 
 Further attention has been given to the 
impact of institutional and legal developments on credit availability. Brown, Jappelli, and 
Pagano (2009), for example, find that information sharing among banks increases perceived 
credit availability for firms, while Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000) show that transition 
countries with better creditor protection have larger aggregate credit levels. While several 
of the above studies examine firm-level accounting and survey data, they do not attempt to 
isolate firm-level credit demand from credit supply. Our paper complements the above 
studies by examining the determinants of credit demand, and distinguishing these from the 
determinants of credit supply. 
                                                 
 
7 Using bank-level accounting data a complementary set of papers shows how financial sector liberalization 




discouragement by firms focus on a single country, i.e. the US, using the National Survey 
on Small Business Lending (Cole (1998); Cole (2008); and Han, Fraser, and Storey 
(2009)).8
Chakravarty and Xiang (2009) also study firm discouragement across 10 emerging 
economies employing the Investment Climate Surveys run by the World Bank in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. They find differences across countries in the firm factors that drive 
discouragement. Our cross-country analysis across 15 Eastern and 5 Western European 
countries using the 2004/2005 BEEPS allows us to also examine how substantial 
differences in the banking structure and institutional environment between emerging and 
developed countries continue to affect firm discouragement. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We present the data in Section 2. We discuss 
our empirical results in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 concludes with a summary of our 
findings and policy implications. 
2. Data 
Our firm-level data comes from the 2004/2005 wave of the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), administered jointly by the World Bank and the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). We exclude data from the 
1999, 2002 and 2008 waves of this survey as they do not provide comparable information 
                                                 
 
8 Discouragement of households from taking loans has also been studied for the US by Jappelli (1990) and 
Chakravarty and Scott (1999) and across regions in Italy by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004). 
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on credit demand and supply. The 2004/2005 BEEPS surveyed, respectively, 5,040 firms 
from 15 Eastern European countries, 3,347 firms from 5 Western European countries, and 
4,615 firms from 12 countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and 
Turkey. In order to not only examine credit demand and supply in Eastern Europe, but also 
to contrast it with credit demand and supply in Western Europe, our analysis is based on the 
Eastern European and Western European samples. 
The 2004/2005 BEEPS asked firms about their experience with financial and legal 
constraints, as well as government corruption. The survey also includes questions about 
firm ownership, firm governance, firm activity and firm financing. The survey response rate 
was 36.9%. The number of firms in our sample ranges from 200 in Bosnia to 1,197 in 
Germany. 
The survey aimed to achieve representativeness in terms of the size of firms it surveyed: 
roughly two thirds of the firms surveyed are “small”, i.e. they have less than 50 workers.9
 
 
By design the survey only covers established firms, i.e. firms which have been in business 
for at least three years. This implies that our sample does not allow us to examine credit 
demand and supply for young or start-up firms. Moreover, our results are subject to sample 
selection, in the sense that we only observe firms which had sufficient internal or external 
funds to survive for at least three years.  
                                                 
 
9 See http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm for a full description of the BEEPS 
surveys including survey methodology and questionnaires. 
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3. Indicators of credit demand and supply 
The survey questionnaire includes three questions about firm financing which allow us to 
identify whether firms need credit, whether they apply for creditor or are discouraged from 
doing so, and whether their loan applications are approved or rejected. In question Q46a, 
firms are first asked if they have a loan or not. Those firms without a loan are then asked in 
Q47b whether they (a) didn’t apply for a loan or (b) applied for a loan, but the application 
was turned down or (c) have a loan application pending. Those firms that didn’t apply for a 
loan are then asked in Q47b to list the main reasons why they did not do so. To this 
question there are multiple possible answers: (a) the firm does not need a loan, (b) 
application procedures are too burdensome, (c) collateral requirements are too high, (d) 
interest rates are too high, (e) informal payments are necessary, (f) the firm did not think 
their application would be approved. 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the responses to these three survey questions for the 
Eastern European and Western European sample separately. The figure shows that for all 
three questions there was almost a 100% response rate, suggesting that the data from which 
we take our indicators of credit demand and supply are reliable. 
 
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
From the above questions we establish three indicators of credit demand and supply. 
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The variable Need loan is a dummy variable which equals 0 for those firms which did not 
apply for a loan and their only reason for not doing so was because they did not need one. 
For all firms which did apply for a loan or which did not apply for a loan and stated another 
reason (besides not needing a loan) the variable Need loan equals 1.10
The variable Discouraged is a dummy variable which equals 1 for those firms which did 
not apply for a loan and for which the variable Need loan equals 1, and equals 0 for those 
firms which applied for a loan, i.e. those which either have a loan, had their application 
rejected, or have an application pending. 
 
The variable Rejected is a dummy variable which equals 1 for those firms which applied for 
a loan but their application was turned down, and equals 0 for those firms which applied for 
a loan and have a loan. Firms with pending applications (74 of the 8,387 firms in our 
sample, i.e. less than 1%) are treated as missing. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our indicators of credit demand and supply by 
country and region. We find that a higher share of firms in Eastern Europe need a bank loan 
compared to Western Europe (70 versus 63 percent). Moreover, a higher fraction of those 
that need a loan are discouraged from applying for one (28 versus 12 percent). The fraction 
of firms that have their loan applications rejected is also slightly higher in Eastern Europe 
than in Western Europe (8 versus 5 percent). Table 1 also shows that there are substantial 
                                                 
 
10 Note that those firms which did not apply for a loan could list multiple reasons for not doing so. According 
to our classification above which listed “Do not need loan” and another reason, e.g., “Interest rates are too 
high”, is classified as needing a loan. Only these firms which provided “Do not need a loan” as a unique 
answer were classified as not needing a loan. 
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cross-country differences in credit demand and supply across Eastern and also across 
Western Europe. In Eastern Europe the fraction of firms needing a loan varies between 56 
percent in the Czech Republic and 78 percent in Croatia or Hungary. Throughout the 
region, discouragement rather than rejection of loan applications seems to be responsible 
for the substantial share of firms which need but do not have loans. The share of firms 
which need but do not apply for a loan varies from 52 percent in Macedonia to 9 percent in 
Slovenia. By contrast loan rejection rates are low (between 2 and 13 percent) in each 
country. In our (limited) sample for Western Europe we see that loan demand also varies 
strongly across countries (43% in Portugal to 79% in Germany), while credit 
discouragement, and in particular loan rejection rates are low in all five countries. 
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
In addition to our three main indicators of credit demand and supply, our analyses use three 
detailed indicators of why firms are discouraged from applying for loans. As mentioned 
above firms could provide multiple reasons for not applying for a loan. The variable 
Discouraged – procedures is a dummy variable which is equals to 1 for all firms that are 
discouraged and stated “application procedures are too burdensome” as one of these 
reasons. The variable Discouraged – interest is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for all 
firms that are discouraged and stated “interest rates are too high” as one of their reasons for 
not applying for a loan. Finally, the variable Discouraged – collateral is a dummy variable 
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which is equal to 1 for all firms which are discouraged and stated “collateral requirements 
are too high” as one of their reasons. 
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that, in Eastern Europe, high interest rates are the 
most common reason for credit discouragement. Among those firms that need a loan, 17% 
say that they are discouraged by interest rates, while 12% mention collateral conditions and 
11% procedures as a reason for not applying for a loan. By contrast, in Western Europe, 
interest rates are less of a reason for discouragement than collateral conditions or 
application procedures. 
A. Firm-level determinants 
We expect that due to alternative financing opportunities, involving soft budget constraints 
and internal capital markets, firms with government or foreign ownership may be less likely 
to need (bank) credit, ceteris paribus.11
Given a firm’s alternative financial sources, its need for bank credit will depend on its 
investment opportunities, which may be affected by the markets it operates in (exporting 
 Also following the pecking-order theory of 
corporate finance we expect firms with higher retained earnings to display less need for 
bank credit, while young, small firms and privatized firms with fewer alternative financing 
sources may be more likely to need credit. 
                                                 
 
11 Loss-making government-owned enterprises in many transition economies initially relied heavily on direct 
subsidies (Kornai, 1979), reducing their need for external financing. However, later on these enterprises were 
increasingly also bailed out by inter-enterprise and even bank credit, demonstrating the possibly endogenous 
and varying nature of the soft budget constraint (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995). 
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vs. domestic), competitive pressure in these markets, as well as the business environment 
(taxation, red-tape, corruption; see Mauro (1995) for example). 
The ownership aspect of the internal capital allocation in Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein 
(1994) leads to more monitoring than bank lending and an easier redeployment of assets of 
poorly performing projects. We therefore expect that small firms are more likely to be 
discouraged from applying for a loan, or more likely to have a loan application rejected, 
while loan applications and approvals should be more frequent for firms with foreign 
ownership, privatized firms, and exporters (as they may be the more easily monitored and 
successful firms that employ redeployable assets),12
Confirming the above predictions recent empirical research by Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano 
(2009), Brown, Ongena, and Yesin (2009), and Ongena and Popov (2009) using the BEEPS 
data, and by Chakravarty and Xiang (2009) using the similar Investment Climate Survey 
data, has shown that firm size, age, ownership, activity, accounting standards, product 
market competition, bank use and internal financing, and obstacles to doing business affect 
credit access and credit terms. 
 as well as for audited firms and firms 
which regularly use bank accounts (because they have more credible financial information 
and need less monitoring; see also Kon and Storey, 2003 as well as Mester, Nakamura and 
Renault, 2007). 
                                                 
 
12 Empirical evidence based on firm-level panel data suggests that more productive firms enter export 
markets. Bernard and Jensen (1999) document among US firms that, in addition to having higher productivity, 
exporting firms also have higher employment, shipments, wages, and capital intensity than non-exporters. 
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) find that exporting firms have higher productivity levels on average than 
non-exporters in several developing countries. 
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Following the above literature we relate our indicators of credit demand and supply to firm-
level indicators of firm size (Small firm), age (Age), ownership structure (Owner 
government, Owner foreign), privatization history (Privatized), owner gender (Owner 
female), export activities (Exporter), and accounting standards (Audited). We further 
feature the number of local product market competitors of the firm (Competitors), the share 
of firm earnings received through a bank account (Bank income), the share of working 
capital financed by retained earnings over the past 12 months (Internal finance), and an 
indicator of the sector in which the firm operates (by SIC 1-digit). Finally, we include the 
assessment of the severity of three growth obstacles, i.e. the tax rate (Tax), business 
licensing and regulations (Licensing & permits), and corruption (Corruption). 
The definitions of these firm-level variables are provided in the appendix. Summary 
statistics for our firm-level variables are presented in Table 2. The table shows that the 
firms in our Eastern European sample are similar in size and ownership to those in our 
Western sample. Not surprisingly, firms in Eastern Europe are more likely to be 
government-owned or privatized, and less likely to be audited than firms in our Western 
European sample. Firms in Eastern Europe also view the markets they operate in as less 
competitive, but their business environment as more cumbersome. Interestingly, firms in 
Eastern Europe are more likely to have exporting activities than firms in Western Europe 
and have a higher fraction of their income flowing through a bank-account. 
 




There is substantial cross-country variation within Eastern Europe. For example only 4 
percent of the firms in Hungary are government-owned, compared to 16 percent of firms in 
Serbia; only 24 percent of the firms in Bulgaria and Romania export, compared to 47 
percent of the Slovenian firms; and only 31 percent of the firms in Macedonia are audited 
while 84 percent are audited in Albania. Table 2 also shows substantial cross-country 
variation in our Western European sample. For example, only 36 percent of surveyed firms 
in Spain are audited, and only 16% percent of firms from Germany are exporters, while in 
the Irish sample 94 percent of firms are audited and 30% of the firms export. These figures 
suggest that when examining cross-country credit demand and supply it is important to also 
control for differences in firm characteristics. 
B. Country-level determinants 
In environments with high levels of asymmetric information and weak investor protection, 
banks’ ability to lend may be impeded even when funds are readily available (Khwaja, 
Mian and Zia (2007)). Moreover, agency problems may impede the issuing of equity (for 
example by banks) to foreign investors (Chari and Henry (2004)). Foreign banks may be 
even more reluctant than domestic financial intermediaries to lend to opaque borrowers. 
Foreign banks could poach depositors and safe borrowers from domestic banks while 
remaining unwilling to lend to local entrepreneurial firms. In addition, foreign acquisitions 
could disperse the "soft" information local lenders have accumulated. 
As in Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000), de Haas and Lelyveld (2006), Giannetti and Ongena 
(2008), and Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2009), we therefore relate our two (inverse) 
indicators of credit supply (Discouraged, Rejected) to foreign ownership in the banking 
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sector (Foreign banks), credit information sharing (Credit info), and creditors’ rights 
(Creditor rights). We expect that credit supply will be positively related to creditor 
protection. The impact of foreign bank ownership on credit supply may, however, depend 
strongly on firm characteristics, with large and transparent firms benefiting more than 
small, opaque firms. 
Besides these structural and institutional features of the banking sector, the macroeconomic 
environment within a country may affect the supply of bank credit. In particular higher 
domestic inflation may reduce bank credit, as has been shown by Boyd, Levine and Smith 
(2001) and confirmed by Fries and Taci (2002) for Eastern Europe. When examining the 
country-level determinants of credit supply we therefore control for the level of domestic 
consumer price Inflation. 
The region of Eastern Europe has seen many radical reforms since the fall of communism 
in 1989 altering the structure of the economy, macroeconomic policy, law and regulation, 
and financial markets. Apart from widespread privatization of state-owned services and 
manufacturing industry, those fundamental changes also included for instance the break-up 
of the one-bank model (under which the central bank and the commercial banks were 
operated under the same authority) and the divestiture of a large share of commercial 
banks’ assets to the private sector and foreign entities (EBRD (2006)). 
However, advances in this direction were uneven across the region. Rapid banking reforms 
were sometimes followed by banking crisis and/or government recapitalization of banks 
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(Hungary in 1991, Estonia in 1992, Latvia and Lithuania in 1995, and Bulgaria and the 
Czech Republic in 1996).13 The reform of the previously socialist-based legal system 
further resulted in a return to some form of pre-WWII state of law which in different parts 
of the region was derived from different legal systems (Nordic, French, or German).14
Finally, while the region has in general moved towards higher macroeconomic stability, 
some countries in the sample had a painful experience with inflation (Bulgaria in 1997) or 
even hyperinflation (Serbia in 1993-1994). For all those reasons, while the region has been 
relatively homogeneous in terms of economic and political experience during the past 20 
years, with 10 of the 15 countries already EU members and the rest on their path to 
accession, we expect to take advantage of the still existing substantial variation in our 
country-level variables of interest. 
 In 
addition, countries embarked on their reforms with different speed – in general, the Baltic 
states and the Vysegrad four (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) were 
much faster to liberalize their economies and their financial sectors than the countries in 
South-Eastern Europe. And while in most countries foreign entry in to the banking sector 
started relatively early, in South-Eastern Europe banking reforms were slower, and 
Slovenia for example allowed foreign bank entry only in 2001. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for our country-level variables and confirms our 
expectation to find considerable variation in the macroeconomic and financial environment 
                                                 
 
13 See Laeven and Valencia (2008). 
14 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998). 
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not just between West and East, but also among countries in the region of Eastern Europe 
itself. 
 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
Not surprisingly, inflation is significantly lower in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. 
Also, while low in Lithuania and Macedonia, it is in the double digits in Romania and 
Serbia. Foreign participation in the banking sector is higher in Eastern than in Western 
Europe, and foreign-owned banks control on average 72 percent of all bank assets. 
However, in Slovenia, Serbia and Macedonia less than 50% of the banking sector assets are 
foreign-owned (20.5%, 47.4%, and 48.5%, respectively). And even in some of the other 
countries lower-than-average foreign bank ownership stems from the fact that the largest 
bank in the country is domestically-owned (for example, in Latvia and Poland). 
Information sharing in the banking sector is more prevalent in Western Europe than in 
Eastern Europe, while creditor rights seem to be stronger on average in Eastern Europe than 
in Western Europe. And while it is not clear that these can be easily linked to the origin of 
legal systems, differences still prevail within the region itself, with creditors’ rights ranging 
from a low of 4 in Bosnia to a high of 9 in Albania, Latvia, and Slovakia, and the degree of 
information sharing ranging from 0 in Albania and Croatia to 5 in Bosnia, Estonia, 




In this section we present our analysis of credit demand and supply based on the BEEPS 
2004/2005 survey. We first examine which firms need a loan. We then examine which 
firms that need credit are discouraged from applying for a loan or have their loan rejected. 
Finally, we relate differences in credit discouragement and rejection across countries to 
financial development, bank ownership and creditor protection. 
A. Which firms need credit? 
Table 4 presents results for four estimated models of credit demand. The dependent 
variable in this set of regressions is the dummy variable Need loan. The probit models 
reported in columns (1-2) examine the firm-level determinants of credit demand using the 
sample of firms from Eastern Europe and Western Europe respectively. Model (3) 
replicates the previous models using data for firms from both Eastern Europe and Western 
Europe. Model (4) compares the determinants of credit demand in Eastern Europe to that in 
Western Europe by using a linear regression in which we add interaction terms of firm-
level variables the region dummy Western Europe.15
 
 
Insert Table 4 here 
                                                 
 
15 The ordinarily reported standard errors and marginal effects of interacted variables in non-linear models 
require corrections (Ai and Norton (2003)). We choose instead to linearize the model and estimate it using 




The results in Model (1) suggest that within Eastern Europe small, government-owned, 
foreign-owned and internally financed firms are less likely to need credit, while old and 
exporting firms are more likely to need credit. The lower demand of government, foreign-
owned and internally financed firms confirms our predictions, as we these firms (may) have 
alternative financing sources. Older firms on the other hand may have burned through their 
initial cash reserves. The higher credit demand for exporters may be explained by a greater 
need for working capital. Taxation and corruption as growth obstacles lead to somewhat 
higher probabilities of the need for credit. 
The impact of firm-ownership and exporting activity on credit demand is also economically 
relevant; according to our estimations state-owned firms are 13% less likely to need credit 
than private firms, foreign-owned firms are 12% less likely to need credit than domestic 
firms, while exporters are 6% more likely to need credit than non-exporters. The impact of 
the availability of internal funds is also economically significant: Firms that are one 
standard deviation more internally financed than the mean firm are around 11% less likely 
to need credit than the mean firm. By contrast, the (unexpected) positive relation between 
firm age and credit need is small in magnitude: Firms that are of average age in our sample 
(12.4 years old) are around 3% more likely to need credit than the youngest firms in our 
sample, i.e. the three-year old firms. 
The results from Models (2-4) suggest that the firm-level determinants of credit demand are 
similar in Eastern Europe to those in Western Europe. In particular, small, government-
owned, foreign-owned and internally financed firms are less likely to need credit in both 
regions. Moreover, the coefficients of our firm-level variables in Model (2) are mostly 
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similar in size to those in Model (1), while the interaction terms of our firm-level variables 
with the region dummy Western Europe yield mostly statistically insignificant coefficients. 
Notable differences in credit demand between the two regions are that small firms and 
firms with more internal funding in Western Europe are less likely to need credit than 
similar firms in Eastern Europe. Also, privatized firms are more likely to need credit in 
Western than in Eastern Europe. 
Our estimates suggest that in Eastern Europe small firms are 4% less likely to need credit, 
while in Western Europe they are 11% less likely to need credit. This lower credit demand 
by small firms suggests that these firms may have either broader access to informal credit 
and internal funds, or that they have less investment opportunities. Responses to further 
questions in the BEEPS suggest that, for our sample of firms, informal financing is actually 
negligible compared to internal funding: Only 3% of firms’ investments are financed with 
informal loans. Moreover, with the variable Internal finance our estimates in Table 4 
control for the availability of retained earnings as a funding source. The lower credit 
demand by small firms in our sample thus seems to be driven by less investment 
opportunities compared to larger firms. 
Result 1: The determinants of credit needs are mostly similar in the two regions. Firms 
with alternative financings sources, i.e. government-owned, foreign-owned and internally 
financed firms, are less likely to need credit in both regions. Small firms are also less likely 
to need credit than larger firms, suggesting that they may have fewer investment 





B. Which firms are discouraged and which firms are denied credit?  
While 70% of the surveyed firms in Eastern Europe need credit, only 46% of them actually 
have credit. Table 1 suggests that most credit constrained firms, i.e. those which need, but 
do not have bank credit are discouraged from applying, rather than actually denied credit: 
28% of the firms which need credit do not apply for credit, while only 8% of those who 
apply for credit have their applications rejected. In this section we examine which firms are 
discouraged from applying for credit and what discourages them from applying. We then 
look at which firms are denied credit after applying. Finally, we estimate the predicted 
rejection rates for those firms which were discouraged from applying for credit, in order to 
assess which share of these firms may have received credit. 
Table 5 presents our regression results for loan application behavior. The dependent 
variable in this set of regressions is the dummy variable Discouraged. As in Table 4 we 
present separate estimates for Eastern Europe (column 1) and Western Europe (column 2) 
and then pool the data from both regions in column (3). In column (4) we again introduce, 
interaction effects of firm-level variables with the dummy variable Western Europe so as to 
compare the firm-level determinants between Eastern and Western Europe. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
 
From our summary statistics in Table 1 we know that a large share of firms in each country 
does not need credit. Moreover, our results in Table 2 suggest that credit demand is related 
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to firm size, ownership and activity. All models reported in Table 5 therefore control for 
selection effects at the loan demand stage. Each model includes the variable Mills ratio - 
Need loan, which is the inverse of the Mills ratio estimated from our models of loan 
demand in Table 4.16
The negative and significant coefficients estimated for Mills ratio – Need loan in Table 5 
suggest that unobservable factors that increase the demand for credit tend to decrease the 
probability of being discouraged. 
 For identification purposes, we drop the variable Internal Finance 
from our regressions of loan discouragement, assuming that while access to internal 
financing may affect credit need, it should not affect the probability of firms to apply for 
credit, given that they need it. 
The results of Model (1) in Table 5 show that within Eastern Europe small firms and firms 
which operate in high-tax environments are more likely to be discouraged applying for a 
loan when they need one, while foreign owned, audited and bank-using firms are less likely 
to be discouraged. Again, the effects displayed in column (1) are economically significant. 
Small firms are 13% less likely to apply for loans than larger firms. Recalling that 72 
percent of the firms apply for a loan in Eastern Europe, the estimated effect of firm size in 
discouraging loan applications is therefore substantial. At -11% and -7% the effects of 
foreign ownership, and audited financial accounts are also economically significant. Firms 
that are one standard deviation more bank-financed are 4% less likely to be discouraged. 
                                                 
 
16 Our selection equations are estimated for each sample of firms separately: Models (1) and (2) in Table 5 use 
Models (1) and (2) from Table 4, respectively, while Models (3-4) in Table 5 use Model (3) from Table 4. 
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The results for Models (2-4) suggest that loan discouragement differs between Eastern and 
Western Europe. We find that small firms are much less discouraged from applying for 
loans in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. Small firms in Western Europe are 9 
percentage points less likely to be discouraged for a loan than small firms in Eastern 
Europe (13 versus 4%). The result that small Eastern European firms are less likely to 
apply for a loan than Western European firms, despite the fact that they need loans more 
often
Model (4) in Table 5 also suggests that in Western Europe, government-owned firms and 
firms in high-tax environments are less likely to be discouraged, while firms with a higher 
share of earnings received through a bank account are more likely to be discouraged than in 
Eastern Europe. The difference in application behavior of government firms may be due to 
the fact that in Eastern Europe these firms possibly are able to rely more on government 
funding than in Western Europe. 
, is one of our key findings. 
What discourages so many firms which need credit from applying for a loan? Our summary 
statistics in Table 1 suggest that collateral requirements, perceived high interest rates, and 
burdensome application procedures all discourage a large share of potential borrowers. 
Table 6 examines which types of firms are discouraged by these three main factors. The 
table shows that small firms in Eastern Europe are discouraged more than large firms due to 
burdensome procedures and high interest rates, but surprisingly not due to strict collateral 
requirements. Moreover, both burdensome procedures and high interest rates are more 
likely to discourage small Eastern European firms than small firms in Western Europe. 
The results presented in Table 6 suggest further that in Eastern Europe foreign owned firms 
and firms using bank accounts more often are less discouraged by procedures than domestic 
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owned firms, while this is not the case in Western Europe. Also in Eastern Europe, audited 
firms are less likely to be discouraged by interest rates and collateral conditions than non-
audited firms, while this effect is weaker in Western Europe. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
Taken together, these findings suggest that information asymmetries between banks and 
firms strongly affect credit discouragement in Eastern Europe compared to Western 
Europe. These results potentially demonstrate the importance of further improving 
institutions (i.e. credit bureaus) and regulations (corporate governance and accounting and 
corporate governance) which alleviate informational asymmetries. 
The large share of discouraged firms, compared to those firms that apply and then are 
rejected credit, suggests that many firms may anticipate being rejected and not apply in the 
first place. We examine this conjecture by estimating hypothetical rejection rates for those 
firms which did not apply, i.e. discouraged firms. 
We first estimate the firm-level determinants of loan rejection, using data for those firms 
that were not discouraged. Table 7 reports the results of this analysis in which the variable 
Rejected is related to firm-level explanatory variables, controlling for country and industry 
fixed effects. All models reported in Table 7 control for selection effects at the loan 
application (and loan demand) stage. Each model includes the variable Mills ratio - 




The coefficients reported in Table 7 suggest that among firms in our Eastern European 
sample, the rejection rate is higher for smaller, younger and privatized firms, while it is 
lower for exporting firms. The results from Model (4) suggest that government owned, 
foreign owned, privatized and audited firms in Western Europe are also less likely to be 
rejected than their counterparts in Eastern Europe. 
 For identification purposes we drop our indicators of the business environment Tax, 
Licensing & permits, and Corruption from our regressions of Rejected, assuming that a 
firm’s perception of its business environment may affect its loan application behavior but 
not the banks actual loan decision. 
 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
The estimated coefficient for Mills-ratio discouraged displayed in Table 7 suggests that 
discouraged firms would have been more likely rejected, had they applied for a loan. Our 
predicted rejection rates for the sample of discouraged firms confirm this result. Based on 
the estimated coefficients in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 we predict the rejection rates for 
the discouraged firms in Eastern and Western Europe separately. 
                                                 
 
17 Our selection equations are estimated for each sample of firms separately: Models (1) and (2) in Table 6 use 
Models (1) and (2) from Table 5 respectively, while Models (3-4) in Table 6 use Model (3) from Table 5. 
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In Table 8 we compare the predicted rejection rate for the discouraged firms to the actual 
rejection rate for the non-discouraged firms. Predicted rejection rates in both Eastern and 
Western Europe are higher, both statistically and economically speaking, than the actual 
rates, i.e. 12.0 versus 7.6%, and 7.7 versus 4.7%. This finding suggests that many firms 
rationally did not apply for loans as they anticipated that they would be rejected anyhow. 
Moreover, the higher discouragement rate in Eastern Europe may be partly explained by a 
larger share of possibly non-creditworthy firms. However, looked at from the other angle, 
these results suggest that the overwhelming share of discouraged firms in Eastern Europe, 
i.e. 88%, may have received a loan had they applied. 
 
Insert Table 8 here 
 
Result 2: At the firm-level the higher rate of discouraged firms in Eastern Europe seems to 
be driven by a stronger reluctance of small and financially opaque firms to apply for a loan 
compared to Western Europe. While many discouraged firms correctly anticipate that their 
loan applications would be rejected, a large majority of discouraged firms seem to be 
creditworthy. 
C. Country-level determinants of discouragement and rejection 
Our summary statistics (Table 1) show that the share of firms which are discouraged from 
applying for a loan, as well as the firms that have their applications rejected is higher in 
Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. Moreover, our regression results in Tables (5-8) 
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suggest the firm-level determinants of credit discouragement and rejection differ between 
Eastern and Western Europe. These findings are not that surprising, given that the 
macroeconomic environment and structural characteristics of the financial sector differ 
strongly between the two regions (see Table 3). In this section we look more closely at how 
inflation, foreign bank ownership, credit information sharing and creditor rights affect 
credit supply across Eastern and Western Europe. 
In Table 9 we relate our five indicators of credit discouragement and credit rejection to our 
firm-level explanatory variables and our country-level indicators of the macroeconomic 
environment (Inflation), the ownership structure in the banking sector (Foreign banks) and 
creditor protection (Credit info, Creditor rights). Models (1-4) examine our indicators of 
discouragement, i.e. Discouraged, Discouraged-procedures, Discouraged-interest, and 
Discouraged-collateral, accounting for selection effects at the credit demand stage.18 
Model 5 examines our indicator of credit rejection, i.e. Rejected, accounting for selection 
effects at the loan application stage.19
 
 All models reported in the table control for industry 
fixed-effects; however, we drop the country fixed effects included in all previous 
regressions. 
Insert Table 9 here 
                                                 
 
18 We include the inverse of Mills ratio estimated from our model of Need loan in column 3 of Table 4, while 
for identification purposes we drop the variable Internal finance from our analysis. 
19 We include the inverse of Mills ratio estimated from our model of Discouraged in column 3 of Table 7, 





Acknowledging the potential biases in our estimates due to omitted country-level variables, 
our results suggest that foreign ownership of the banking sector has a robust negative 
impact on loan application behavior. The estimated effects, suggest that going from the 
country with the weakest presence of foreign banks in Eastern Europe (Slovenia) to the 
country with the strongest presence of foreign banks (Slovakia) would increase the share of 
discouraged borrowers by 17%. Hereby, the effect is strongest for the share of firms 
discouraged by high interest rates (10%) and weakest for the share of firms discouraged by 
burdensome procedures (4.5%). The results reported in Table 9 show no robust effect of 
inflation or creditor protection on credit discouragement. 
The fact that discouragement is related to foreign bank presence, combined with our earlier 
result that small and opaque firms are most likely to be discouraged, seems to provide 
support for the conjecture that foreign banks “cherry-pick” in host country credit markets. 
In particular, our results on discouragement seem to support the hypothesis of Detragiache, 
Gupta and Tressel (2007) that foreign banks lend to large firms with credible financial 
statements rather than small, opaque firms. However, note that we find no significant effect 
of foreign bank presence on loan rejection rates. Thus while more firms may be 
discouraged due to the presence of foreign banks, this does not imply that more firms 
would have their loans applications denied. 
Result 3: The higher rate of discouraged firms in Eastern Europe seems to be driven by the 
presence of foreign bank rather than differences in the macroeconomic environment or 
creditor protection. However, we find no evidence that foreign bank presence leads to 
stricter loan approval decisions. 
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5. Policy implications 
Summarizing our results we find that firms in Eastern Europe are equally likely to need 
credit as firms in Western Europe, but are more likely to be discouraged from applying for 
a loan. Firms in Eastern Europe are most discouraged by high interest rates, but also by 
collateral requirements and loan application procedures. Small firms and opaque firms are 
most likely to be discouraged, and well as firms in countries with a strong foreign bank 
presence. The loan approval rate for firms in Eastern Europe is similar to Western Europe. 
Moreover, it seems that most firms which are discouraged from applying for a loan, may 
have received a loan had they applied for one. 
We draw three conclusions for policy from these results: 
First, public policy aimed at increasing credit availability for firms in Eastern Europe 
should be aware that many firms across Eastern Europe, as in Western Europe, do not need 
bank credit to finance their operations and investments. Small firms, government-owned 
and foreign-owned firms are among those with lower need for credit while export-
orientated firms have a higher credit demand. 
Second, the majority of credit constrained firms are discouraged from applying for loans in 
the first place. Is loan discouragement a problem? As discouragement is particularly high 
among small and opaque firms, as well as in countries with a strong presence of foreign 
banks, it seems that firms perceive lending standards to have become more reliant on “hard 
information” with the entry of foreign banks. However, as we find that loan rejection rates 
are not related to foreign bank presence, it seems that the firms’ perceptions of the likely 
lending conditions may be too pessimistic. Thus more transparency about credit eligibility 
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and conditions may improve credit access, particularly in countries with a high presence of 
foreign banks.  
Third, our results suggest that it is hard to determine how a credit crunch induced by the 
current financial crisis may impact economic performance across the region. On the one 
hand, our results suggest that small firms which dominate economic activity in the region 
are less reliant on bank credit, and thus may be less affected by the current crisis through 
the credit channel. On the other hand, we find that export orientated firms are in particular 
need of bank credit across the region. These firms, which are already hit hard by the decline 
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Figure 1. Loan incidence
This figure displays the share of firms which report that they have a loan from a financial institution by
region / country for the BEEPS 2004/2005 survey. Western Europe covers Germany, Greece, Ireland,










(missing = 0) Has loan Has no loan
2,330 2,710
(46.2%)
(missing = 4) Rejected Did not apply Pending
127 2,531 48
(2.5%)
(missing = 12) No need (only reason Discouraged (other reason 
1,525 for not applying) 994 for not applying)
(30.3%) (19.7%)
Total missing or pending: 64 (1.3%)
Firm (n=3,347) 
(missing = 0) Has loan Has no loan
1,755 1,592
(52.4%)
(missing = 1) Rejected Did not apply Pending
53 1,512 26
(1.6%)
(missing = 7) No need (only reason Discouraged (other reason 
1,255 for not applying) 250 for not applying)
(37.5%) (7.5%)
Total missing or pending: 34 (1.0%)
Need loan = 0
Need loan = 1, Discouraged = 1 
Need loan = 1, Discouraged = 0, Rejected = 1
Need loan = 1, Discouraged = 0, Rejected = 0
Western Europe, BEEPS 2004
 Eastern Europe, BEEPS 2005
Figure 2. Responses to BEEPS questions on credit access
The figure summarizes the responses of firms to questions Q46a, Q47a and Q47b of the 2004/2005 BEEPS survey.
Q46a elicits whether firms have currently have a loan from a financial institution. For those which do not have a loan
Q47a elicits whether the firm (i) did not apply for a loan, (ii) applied for a loan but was rejected, or (iii) has a loan
application pending. For those firms that did not apply for a loan Q47b elicits the reason(s) for not applying. 







Eastern Europe, 2005 5,040 0.70 0.28 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.12
Albania 204 0.68 0.25 0.10 0.09 0.17 0.09
Bosnia 200 0.76 0.18 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.05
Bulgaria 300 0.65 0.30 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.04
Croatia 236 0.78 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.03
Czech Rep 343 0.56 0.34 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.12
Estonia 219 0.60 0.18 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.08
Hungary 610 0.78 0.26 0.04 0.08 0.19 0.12
Latvia 205 0.70 0.20 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.04
Lithuania 205 0.71 0.25 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.10
Macedonia 200 0.68 0.52 0.11 0.21 0.37 0.15
Poland 975 0.68 0.40 0.09 0.14 0.27 0.22
Romania 600 0.72 0.26 0.11 0.16 0.15 0.13
Serbia 300 0.76 0.36 0.09 0.15 0.25 0.15
Slovak Rep 220 0.62 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.07
Slovenia 223 0.72 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03
Western Europe, 2004 3,347 0.63 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05
Germany 1,197 0.79 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06
Greece 546 0.44 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.04
Ireland 501 0.67 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
Portugal 505 0.43 0.29 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.08
Spain 598 0.58 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06
This table reports means for each variable by country and region. Definitions and sources of the variables are provided in the appendix.





















Eastern Europe, 2005 5,040 0.71 2.51 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.21 0.30 0.48 2.48 54.11 65.79 2.81 1.93 2.18
Albania 204 0.74 2.20 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.35 0.84 2.42 33.61 78.06 3.15 2.13 2.83
Bosnia 200 0.61 2.52 0.10 0.04 0.18 0.18 0.36 0.47 2.41 47.31 64.95 2.43 1.88 2.40
Bulgaria 300 0.74 2.54 0.08 0.08 0.13 0.26 0.24 0.42 2.45 39.03 66.17 2.37 1.89 2.17
Croatia 236 0.65 2.78 0.11 0.06 0.21 0.12 0.36 0.48 2.50 58.77 55.54 2.20 1.86 2.13
Czech Rep 343 0.76 2.33 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.26 0.35 2.39 54.94 54.17 3.41 2.18 2.45
Estonia 219 0.74 2.42 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.21 0.31 0.83 2.42 76.25 64.61 1.52 1.63 1.69
Hungary 610 0.72 2.45 0.04 0.08 0.11 0.31 0.36 0.72 2.33 68.10 52.47 3.20 1.70 1.73
Latvia 205 0.74 2.35 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.31 0.25 0.62 2.50 57.31 46.60 2.73 1.70 1.75
Lithuania 205 0.68 2.51 0.12 0.04 0.17 0.18 0.34 0.45 2.45 65.37 56.88 3.02 1.83 2.16
Macedonia 200 0.74 2.55 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.14 0.30 0.31 2.64 41.77 66.65 2.41 2.21 2.62
Poland 975 0.75 2.58 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.27 0.25 0.38 2.59 56.66 75.66 3.30 1.94 2.21
Romania 600 0.65 2.44 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.24 0.36 2.57 30.60 71.51 2.85 2.38 2.60
Serbia 300 0.66 2.59 0.16 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.33 0.36 2.38 52.81 79.92 2.80 2.01 2.47
Slovak Rep 220 0.68 2.45 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.35 0.55 2.55 66.41 60.97 1.87 1.48 1.80
Slovenia 223 0.71 2.83 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.22 0.47 0.38 2.33 72.75 65.72 2.23 1.60 1.55
Western Europe, 2004 3,347 0.79 2.55 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.21 0.20 0.59 2.78 15.83 56.16 2.44 1.76 1.57
Germany 1,197 0.79 2.67 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.15 0.16 0.54 2.74 0.73 50.62 2.66 1.75 1.40
Greece 546 0.81 2.52 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.21 0.19 0.47 2.85 5.62 71.32 2.64 1.65 1.69
Ireland 501 0.78 2.76 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.35 0.33 0.94 2.68 82.16 48.52 2.13 1.61 1.26
Portugal 505 0.77 2.52 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.33 0.19 0.78 2.82 1.53 66.20 2.51 2.37 2.15
Spain 598 0.78 2.18 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.20 0.36 2.84 12.36 64.96 2.02 1.51 1.63
Table 2.  Firm characteristics
This table reports the means for each variable by country and region. Definitions and sources of the variables are provided in the appendix.
Inflation Foreign banks Credit info Creditor rights
Eastern Europe, 2005 4.39 72.1 3.4 6.8
Albania 2.43 77.6 0.0 9.0
Bosnia 1.47 83.8 5.0 4.0
Bulgaria 5.41 79.6 3.3 8.0
Croatia 2.71 91.2 0.0 4.5
Czech Rep 2.01 85.2 4.3 7.0
Estonia 3.21 98.3 5.0 6.0
Hungary 4.84 76.4 5.0 7.0
Latvia 5.99 53.2 2.3 9.0
Lithuania 1.47 92.7 4.0 5.0
Macedonia 1.04 48.5 3.0 7.0
Poland 2.22 72.4 4.0 8.0
Romania 10.65 57.5 4.3 6.5
Serbia 12.73 47.4 5.0 5.5
Slovak Rep 6.34 96.8 3.0 9.0
Slovenia 3.39 20.5 3.0 6.0
Western Europe, 2004 2.83 20.7 4.8 5.6
Germany 1.49 5.9 6.0 8.0
Greece 3.26 24.3 4.0 3.0
Ireland 3.18 35.8 5.0 8.0
Portugal 2.95 26.3 4.0 3.0
Spain 3.29 11.3 5.0 6.0
Inflation Foreign banks Credit info Creditor rights
Inflation 1
Foreign banks -0.01 1
Credit info 0.11 -0.32 1
Creditor rights 0.10 0.16 -0.16 1
Table 3.  Country characteristics
This table reports means for each variable by country and region (Panel A) as well as pairwise correlations 
(Panel B). Data for 2005 are 2003-2005 averages. Data for 2004 are 2002-2004 averages. The regional 
averages are unweighted averages across countries. Definitions and sources of the variables are provided in 
the appendix.
Panel A. Means per country and region
Panel B. Pairwise correlations
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Regions covered Eastern Europe Western Europe
Eastern & Western 
Europe
Main effects Western Europe *
Small Firm -0.043** -0.110*** -0.063*** -0.037** -0.059**
[0.017] [0.029] [0.018] [0.016] [0.027]
Age 0.019* 0.032** 0.026*** 0.020** 0.001
[0.010] [0.015] [0.008] [0.009] [0.017]
Owner government -0.130** -0.180* -0.158*** -0.114** -0.020
[0.056] [0.100] [0.051] [0.049] [0.082]
Owner foreign -0.122*** -0.212*** -0.149*** -0.108*** -0.061
[0.042] [0.056] [0.032] [0.037] [0.056]
Privatized firm 0.020 0.163** 0.021 0.015 0.150**
[0.025] [0.070] [0.029] [0.022] [0.061]
Owner female -0.004 -0.044 -0.020 -0.005 -0.029
[0.019] [0.050] [0.023] [0.017] [0.043]
Exporter 0.064** 0.044 0.058*** 0.058** -0.032
[0.029] [0.034] [0.022] [0.024] [0.030]
Audited 0.019 -0.028 0.001 0.015 -0.037
[0.019] [0.026] [0.019] [0.017] [0.023]
Competition 0.019 0.000 0.014 0.018 -0.014
[0.014] [0.037] [0.014] [0.014] [0.028]
Bank income 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Tax 0.031*** 0.017 0.025** 0.030*** -0.015
[0.008] [0.023] [0.011] [0.008] [0.019]
Licencing & permits 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.007 -0.002
[0.012] [0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.013]
Corruption 0.035*** -0.009 0.024** 0.032*** -0.037
[0.006] [0.030] [0.011] [0.006] [0.025]
Internal finance -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.002**
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Method Probit Probit Probit OLS
(Pseudo) R2 0.10 0.21 0.15 0.18
Country effects yes yes yes yes
Industry effects yes yes yes yes
# firms 4,349 3,025 7,374 7,374
# countries 15 5 20 20
The dependent variable in this table is Need loan . Models (1-2) report marginal effects from probit estimations using data from Eastern Europe and Western
Europe respectively. Model (3) reports marginal effects from a probit regression using data from both regions. Model (4) reports estimates from an OLS
regression using data from both regions and including interaction terms between the dummy variable Western Europe and firm-level variables. All regressions
include country and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Table 4.  Need loan
Eastern & Western Europe
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Regions covered
Eastern Europe Western Europe
Eastern & Western 
Europe
Main effects Western Europe *
Small Firm 0.129*** 0.040*** 0.089*** 0.118*** -0.087***
[0.026] [0.011] [0.015] [0.023] [0.026]
Age 0.001 -0.015 -0.003 0.004 -0.018
[0.019] [0.014] [0.011] [0.017] [0.019]
Owner government 0.108 -0.042 0.072* 0.099* -0.177**
[0.067] [0.026] [0.040] [0.056] [0.062]
Owner foreign -0.114*** -0.006 -0.073*** -0.080*** 0.065
[0.030] [0.038] [0.020] [0.024] [0.047]
Privatized firm -0.037 0.049 -0.03 -0.016 0.018
[0.040] [0.066] [0.024] [0.031] [0.070]
Owner female 0.001 0.018 0.006 0.002 0.018
[0.024] [0.015] [0.015] [0.022] [0.024]
Exporter -0.017 -0.041*** -0.028* -0.028 0
[0.022] [0.015] [0.015] [0.018] [0.031]
Audited -0.074*** -0.026 -0.055*** -0.087*** 0.06
[0.020] [0.027] [0.020] [0.018] [0.040]
Competition 0.017 0.021 0.016 0.012 0.011
[0.016] [0.022] [0.012] [0.015] [0.025]
Bank income -0.001** 0 -0.001** -0.001** 0.002**
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Tax 0.040*** 0.008** 0.026*** 0.030*** -0.015*
[0.008] [0.003] [0.004] [0.007] [0.008]
Licencing & permits 0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.001 -0.005
[0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.010]
Corruption 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.016
[0.008] [0.010] [0.006] [0.008] [0.013]
Mills ratio - Need loan -0.051*** -0.006*** -0.030*** -0.018***
[0.008] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003]
Method Probit Probit Probit OLS
Selection corrected yes yes yes yes
(Pseudo) R2 0.16 0.12 0.17 0.17
Country effects yes yes yes yes
Industry effects yes yes yes yes
# firms 3,031 1,930 4,961 4,961
# countries 15 5 20 20
Table 5.  Discouraged
The dependent variable in this table is Discouraged. Models (1-3) report marginal effects from probit estimations using data from
Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and both regions respectively. Model (4) reports estimates from a linear regression using data from
both regions and including interaction terms between the dummy variable Western Europe and firm-level variables. Each model is
corrected for selection effects at the loan demand stage using Models (1-4) from Table 4 respectively as 1st stage regressions. All
regressions include country and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the
country level.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. All variables are defined in the Appendix.




Main effects Western Europe * Main effects Western Europe * Main effects Western Europe *
Small Firm 0.046*** -0.027* 0.085*** -0.079*** 0.029 -0.01
[0.010] [0.015] [0.019] [0.023] [0.024] [0.024]
Age -0.001 -0.009 0.01 -0.014 0.000 -0.008
[0.006] [0.008] [0.010] [0.011] [0.009] [0.010]
Owner government -0.025 -0.003 -0.051 0.011 -0.015 -0.043
[0.032] [0.033] [0.037] [0.038] [0.027] [0.025]
Owner foreign -0.031** 0.032** -0.061*** 0.036 -0.044** 0.004
[0.012] [0.014] [0.019] [0.027] [0.016] [0.021]
Privatized firm -0.032** 0.053 -0.009 -0.048* -0.015 -0.029
[0.013] [0.032] [0.023] [0.025] [0.019] [0.023]
Owner female 0.012 -0.015 -0.001 0.014 0.005 -0.009
[0.015] [0.015] [0.018] [0.022] [0.010] [0.017]
Exporter 0.003 0 -0.032** 0.008 -0.009 0.011
[0.010] [0.016] [0.015] [0.023] [0.011] [0.017]
Audited -0.03 0.024 -0.026** 0.013 -0.048*** 0.046**
[0.019] [0.027] [0.012] [0.015] [0.012] [0.020]
Competition 0.007 -0.004 0.007 0.005 0.013 -0.006
[0.006] [0.018] [0.007] [0.007] [0.010] [0.022]
Bank income -0.000** 0.001** -0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Tax 0.007 -0.009 0.032*** -0.021*** 0.021*** -0.014*
[0.007] [0.009] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.008]
Licencing & permits 0.01 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.007 0.001
[0.008] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008]
Corruption -0.001 0.012 0.004 0.004 0.002 -0.002
[0.008] [0.010] [0.006] [0.011] [0.005] [0.010]
Mills ratio - Need loan -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.010***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.002]
Method OLS OLS OLS
Selection corrected yes yes yes
R2 0.06 0.13 0.08
Country effects yes yes yes
Industry effects yes yes yes
# firms 4,961 4,961 4,961
# countries 20 20 20
Eastern & Western EuropeEastern & Western Europe Eastern & Western Europe
Discouraged - procedures Discouraged - interest Discouraged - collateral
(2)(1) (3)
Table 6.  Discouragement by category
The dependent variables in this table are Discouraged - procedures (Model 1), Discouraged - collateral (Model 2) and Discouraged - interest (Model 3). All
models reports estimates from a linear regression using data from both regions and include interaction terms between the dummy variable Western Europe
and firm-level variables. Each model is corrected for selection effects at the loan demand stage using Model 3 from Table 4 as the 1st stage regression. All
regressions include country and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the country level. ***, **, *
denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Regions covered Eastern Europe Western Europe Eastern & Western Europe
Main effects Western Europe *
Small Firm 0.025* -0.007 0.016 0.012 -0.020
[0.014] [0.013] [0.010] [0.013] [0.013]
Age -0.013*** 0.001 -0.008*** -0.013* 0.008
[0.005] [0.004] [0.003] [0.007] [0.008]
Owner government 0.038 0.009 0.018 0.026 -0.051**
[0.027] [0.010] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019]
Owner foreign 0.027 0.000 0.016 -0.044**
[0.032] [0.021] [0.020] [0.021]
Privatized firm 0.036** 0.025* 0.037** -0.081***
[0.018] [0.015] [0.017] [0.022]
Owner female 0.016 -0.004 0.007 0.014 -0.009
[0.010] [0.012] [0.008] [0.012] [0.022]
Exporter -0.025* 0.021* -0.011 -0.017 0.024
[0.014] [0.011] [0.010] [0.015] [0.018]
Audited 0.000 -0.032*** -0.015 0.004 -0.044*
[0.014] [0.005] [0.012] [0.016] [0.022]
Competition -0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.006 0.018
[0.006] [0.008] [0.006] [0.007] [0.013]
Bank income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Mills ratio - Discouraged 0.059*** 0.147** 0.057*** 0.107***
[0.019] [0.070] [0.018] [0.035]
Method Probit Probit Probit OLS
Selection corrected yes yes yes yes
(Pseudo) R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.05
Country effects yes yes yes yes
Industry effects yes yes yes yes
# firms 2,188 1,610 3,900 3,900
# countries 15 5 20 20
Table 7.  Rejected
The dependent variable in this table is Rejected Models (1-3) report marginal effects from probit estimations using data from Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and both regions
respectively. Model (4) reports estimates from a linear regression using data from both regions and includes interaction terms between the dummy variable Western Europe and
firm-level variables. Each model is corrected for selection effects at the loan demand and application stage using Models (1-4) from Table 5 respectively as 1st stage
regressions. All regressions include country and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. All variables are defined in the Appendix.





Rejection rate in % (actual) (predicted)
Eastern Europe 7.6% 12.0% ***
Western Europe 4.7% 7.7% **
Table 8.  Predicted rejection rates for discouraged borrowers
This table compares the actual rejection rates (in %) for non-discouraged borrowers to the predicted
rejection rates for discouraged borrowers by region. Predicted rejection rates are based on Model (1)
in Table 6 for firms in Eastern Europe and Model (2) in Table 6 for firms in Western Europe. ***, **,
* denote significance of t-tests at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Regions covered
Dependant variable







Small Firm 0.088*** 0.037*** 0.051*** 0.025* 0.018**
[0.015] [0.009] [0.011] [0.015] [0.008]
Age -0.003 -0.006 0.003 -0.004 -0.008**
[0.011] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.004]
Owner government 0.116** -0.007 -0.013 -0.002 0.021
[0.046] [0.022] [0.025] [0.020] [0.019]
Owner foreign -0.064*** -0.020** -0.048*** -0.043*** 0
[0.025] [0.010] [0.012] [0.009] [0.021]
Privatized firm -0.019 -0.022* -0.006 -0.021 0.027
[0.033] [0.011] [0.023] [0.015] [0.016]
Owner female 0.014 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.003
[0.017] [0.008] [0.011] [0.008] [0.008]
Exporter -0.026* 0.003 -0.024** -0.004 -0.013
[0.015] [0.008] [0.011] [0.009] [0.011]
Audited -0.074*** -0.027** -0.026** -0.034*** -0.021*
[0.022] [0.013] [0.011] [0.013] [0.012]
Competition 0.014 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.001
[0.013] [0.006] [0.005] [0.009] [0.006]
Bank income -0.001** -0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Tax 0.037*** 0.006 0.028*** 0.020***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004]
Licencing & permits 0.004 0.009* 0.001 0.008*
[0.006] [0.005] [0.003] [0.004]
Corruption 0.013 0.007 0.010 0.004
[0.008] [0.006] [0.006] [0.004]
Mills ratio - Need loan -0.032*** -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.012***
[0.005] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Mills ratio - Discouraged 0.047***
[0.010]
Inflation 0.003 0.004*** 0.003 0.001 0.001
[0.006] [0.001] [0.004] [0.002] [0.001]
Foreign banks 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Credit info 0.010 0.003 0.000 0.011*** -0.003
[0.009] [0.003] [0.006] [0.004] [0.003]
Creditor rights 0.007 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.003
[0.008] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005] [0.002]
Method Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Selection corrected yes yes yes yes yes
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.10 0.07
Country effects no no no no no
Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes
# firms 4,961 4,961 4,961 4,961 3,900
# countries 20 20 20 20 20
Table 9.  Country-level determinants of Discouraged  and Rejected
The dependent variables in this table are Discouraged (model 1), Discouraged-procedures (model 2), Discouraged-interest (model
3), Discouraged-collateral (model 4), and Rejected (model 5). All models report marginal effects based on probit estimates. Models
(1-4) are corrected for selection effects at the loan demand stage using Model 3 from Table 4 as the 1st stage regression. Models (5) is
corrected for selection effects at the loan discouragement stage using Model 3 from Table 7 as the 1st stage regression. Standard errors
are reported in brackets and account for clustering at the country level. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level.
All variables are defined in the Appendix.
Eastern & Western Europe
Variable name Definition Source
Need loan Dummy=1 if the firm needs a loan, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Discouraged Dummy=1 if the firm needs a loan and did not apply for one, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Rejected Dummy=1 if the firm applied for a loan and the application was not approved, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Discouraged - Procedures Dummy=1 if the firm needs a loan and did not apply due to procedures, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Discouraged - Interest Dummy=1 if the firm needs a loan and did not apply due to interest rate, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Discouraged - Collateral Dummy=1 if the firm needs a loan and did not apply due to collateral conditions =0 otherwise BEEPS
Small firm Dummy =1 if firm has fewer than 50 employees, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Firm age Firm age in log years BEEPS
Owner government Dummy =1 if firm owned by government or government agency, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Owner foreign Dummy =1 if firm owned by a foreign company, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Privatized Dummy =1 if the firm went from state to private ownership in the past, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Owner female Dummy =1 if one of the firms' principal owners is female, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Exporter Dummy =1 if the firm has export sales, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Audited Dummy =1 if the firm has audited accounts, =0 otherwise BEEPS
Competition Number of local competitors: 1= none, 2= 1-3, 3= 4 or more BEEPS
Bank income Share of firm earnings received through a bank account BEEPS
Tax Tax rate as growth obstacle: 1= no, 2= minor, 3= moderate, 4= major obstacle BEEPS
Licensing & permits Business licensing and regulations as growth obstacle: 1= no, 2= minor, 3= moderate, 4= major obstacle BEEPS
Corruption Corruption as growth obstacle: 1= no, 2= minor, 3= moderate, 4= major obstacle BEEPS
Internal finance Share of working capital financed by retained earnings, past 12 months BEEPS
Inflation Consumer price inflation in % WDI, IFS
Foreign banks Assets share of foreign controlled banks in domestic banking system, in % EBRD
Credit info Information sharing index, scale 0-6 DB, BJP2009, DMS 2007
Creditor rights_DB Index of legal rights of secured creditors, scale 0-10 DB, BJP2009, DMS 2007
Eastern Europe Dummy=1 for Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia, Croatia, Czech Rep., Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovak Rep. and Slovenia, =0 otherwise
Western Europe Dummy=1 for Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, =0 otherwise
Appendix. Variables - Definitions and sources
Sources: WDI: World Development Indicators, World Bank. IFS:  International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. EBRD: Transition indicators, European Bank for Reco    
DB: Doing Business indicators, World Bank. DMS2007: Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007), BJP2009: Brown, Jappelli & Pagano (2009).
Regional dummies
Firm characteristics
Credit demand and credit supply
Country characteristics
